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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of health foreign assistance on physicians’ brain drain. We use
the database from Bhargava and Docquier (2008) to explain physicians’ brain drain and health
foreign assitance from 1995 to 2003 using a bilateral gravity equation model. In the first time,
we propose to investigate the direct and reverse impact of health assistance through Simul-
taneous Equation Model with Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) methodology and highlight
a significant negative effect of health foreign assistance on the medical brain drain whereas
emigration rate of doctor increases the amount of health aid received by recipient countries. In
a second time, we analyzed the indirect effect of health aid via epidemics prevalence through
the death rate per 1000 people. We find that health aid plays a key role in the improvement
of vaccination, treatment and prevention which may reduce death rate and, finally, decreases
the physicians emigration rates. These findings confirm the efficiency of health foreign aid to
weaken the vicious circle of physicians drain.
Cet article analyse l’impact de l’aide sante´ sur la fuite des me´decins. Nous utilisons la base
de donne´es de Bhargava et Docquier (2008) pour expliquer la fuite des me´decins et l’aide
sante´ de 1995 2003 en utilisant un mode´le bilatral de gravite´. Dans un premier temps, nous
e´tudions l’impact direct et la causalite´ reverse de l’aide sante´ travers un mode´le d’e´quations
simultane´es avec la mthode des Triples Moindres Carre´es et nous trouvons un effet significatif
et ne´gatif sur la fuite des cerveaux dans le secteur me´dical. Alors que le taux d’e´migration de
docteur lui augmente le montant de l’aide la sante´ recu par le pays receveur. Dans un second
temps, nous analysons l’impact indirect de l’aide sante´ via la pre´valence d’e´pide´mies capte´ par
le taux de mortalite´ brut pour 1000 personnes. Nous trouvons qu’il joue un roˆle important
dans l’ame´lioration des taux de vaccination, des traitements et de la pre´vention qui re´duit
le taux de mortalite´ et, a´ son tour, de´croˆıt le taux d’e´migration des me´decins. Ces re´sultats
confirment l’efficacite´ de l’aide sante´ dans le ralentissement de ce cercle vicieux de la fuite des
me´decins.
Keywords: International Migration, Physicians Emigration Rates, Foreign Aid, Health for-
eign assistance, Simultaneous Equation Model, Three Stage Least Squares, Gravity Equation
model.
JEL classification: F22 - F35 - O15 - C23 - I1 - O11.
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1 Introduction
Over the last twenty-five years, international migrations became an important figure of the glob-
alisation. In 1965, the world counts 75 millions of migrants (2% of world population), and in 2000
the number of migrants is around 175 millions which corresponds to 3% of the world population
(Nations (2001) ,Simon (2002)). This migration is equally balanced between ”‘North-North mi-
gration”’, ”‘South- North migration”’ and ”‘South-South migration”’. The last one is being an
increasing phenomenon during the last year, but because of lack in data, few studies have been
realised.
Over the last decades, there was a huge debate focused on the impact of brain drain in the
developing countries. On one hand, the traditional view ( Miyagiwa (1991), Haque and S.J (1995),
Bhagwati and Dellafar (1973)) shows a negative effect of labour migrations and specially of skilled
migrations. It could be explained by the net loss of human capital with negative convergence on
the development process of sending countries.
On the other hand, more recently, a more optimistic view has emerged.
First, theoretical (Mountford (1997)) and empirical approaches (Beine et al. (2001)) show a
positive effect of migration’s perspective on the expected change in education’s level of non mi-
grant population. In fact, in developing countries where the return to education is very low, the
migration’s perspective increases the incentive to invest in education which raises the level of hu-
man capital. Even though part of educated people will migrate finally, most people stay at home
with a higher education level which create positive externalities for growth. This positive feedback
takes the name of ”‘Brain Gain”’. In other words, in countries where the brain drain is important,
the level of education appears higher.
Second, positive impact of skilled worker emigration on origin’s countries can be transmitted
through the amount of remittances from migrants to their relatives (Adams (2006)). It can have
an impact on the family educational level (Mansuri (2006)), their health mac kinnon and finaly
their welfare (Azam and Gubert (2002)).
Third, whereas the traditional view has seen the migration process has definitive, the recent
one analyzed migration as ”‘pendulum”’. So return migration can contributes to the development
process through knowledge and technology diffusion Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2005) and busi-
ness entreprise enlargement (Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002)).
Finally, diaspora externalities (Beine et al. (2008)) permits information exchange accross the
world. This permit to increase the foreign direct investments (Kugler and Rapoport (2007)), trade
(Head and Ries (1998)) and social norms diffusion (Beine et al. (2008)) as such fertility rates.
However, Docquier (2007) showed that, after a threshold of 15% of emigration, brain gain cannot
compensate the brain drain.
As skilled migration, the emigration of physicians’ from developing countries to developed
countries has increased. For example, according to American Medical Association, in 2002, 23% of
physicians in Canada were trained abroad (Astor et al. (2005)).
This phenomenon is acquiring a big importance for several reasons in OECD countries:
(i) Developed countries face an ageing population which is and will be big consumers of health and
medical services in the future.
(ii) In OECD countries, a decline in the number of children per women consequently leads to a
reduction of new students in medecine and finally to a possible reduction in new physicians and
new health workers. Even if the number of health diploma, particularly in Europe, is fixed by the
”‘numerus closus”’, the demography has a significant impact on the replacement of doctors (OECD
(2008a)).
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(iii) The educationnal medical system in developed countries itself is unable to create sufficiently
medical workers compared to the shortage observed in the medical labour market. As said before,
the ”‘numerous closus”’ is fixed and not take into account the need of population in health care
(OECD (2008a)).
This gap between health demand and health supply pushed developed countries to host medical
workers and to compete with other developed countries for the recruitement of health workforce
from all over the world. Because globalisation has caused interaction between countries, developing
countries may face an emigration in health sector and it may cause, in turn, a shortage of medical
workers in these countries.
The impact of such emigration for sending countries on the health outcomes is large, and par-
ticularly on the achievement of the Millenium Development Goals in the health sector. The fourth
Goal is to reduce by two third in 2015 the under-five mortality rate, the fifth is to improve the
maternal health and the sixth is to fight epidemics such as HIV-AIDS, malaria and others (Nations
(2008)). In all these objectives, the need of professionals health care is so important to improve
the health population and to attain this target in 2015.
When the International Community adopted the Millenium Development Goals in 2000, one of
the tools which was preconised to attain these objectives was to increase the Official Development
Assistance (ODA) toward developing countries. As a symbol, in 2005, ODA goes up to the thresh-
old of $100 billion. Official Development Assistance, and particularly in the health sector, has the
property to increase the infrastructure such as new hospitals, more medicines and drugs, vaccina-
tion and prevention programs, new equipement... However, because the number of health workers,
and particularly doctors and nurses, are not sufficient (especially in rural and less wealthier areas
(Dussault and Franceschini (2006)), the operating and access of these facilities remain limited. The
increase in health infrastructure may be accompanied with an increase in health professional to
improve the health quality in developing countries.
The management of health workforce around the world seems to be consider in developed and
developing countries. Already in seventies, Bhagwati and Dellafar (1973) proposed to tax skilled
emigration to compensate the expected shortfall. This preconisation was theorically efficient but
it caused such operating and functioning problems that policymakers did not decide to implement
this policy. Then, developed countries has become more selective in their immigration policies,
on one hand, through the restriction of visas delivrance and, on the other hand, through the re-
inforcement of borders control to deter illegal immigrants. Finally, OECD organisation advocates
coherence in migration, trade and aid policies between developed and developing countries for the
attainment of development process (OCDE (2007)). Cogneau and Lambert (2006) investigate the
relationship between foreign aid, trade and migration in a macroeconomic approach. They conclude
that foreign aid responds to a compensation of other flows (trade, capital flows and migration).
Nevertheless, policy implications about the control of these flows and the linkage between them is
very complex and not easy to implement.
Our paper try to evaluate the effect of health foreign aid on the medical brain drain and his
capacity to retain medical workers. The contribution of this paper is triple.
Firstly, even if theorical research exist on this topic (Gaytan-Fregoso and Lahiri (2000) and
Schiff (1994)), few study (Berthe´le´my et al. (2008)) investigates empirically the effect of foreign aid
on migration. However this study focuses on general migration whereas we analyses this correlation
particularly in health sector.
Secondly, we use a new database on bilateral medical brain drain (Bhargava and Docquier
(2007)) which allows panel analysis. It covers the bilateral physicians’ emigration of 192 develop-
ing countries (even in Sub-Saharan Africa) to 16 OECD countries over 14 years (1991-2004).
Thirdly, policy implications are important on the impact of health foreign assistance on the
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medical brain drain. As Kugler and Rapoport (2007) asked, are international labor and foreign aid
in health sector complements or substitutes? Subsitutes means that aid is a great tool to reduce
physicians emigration by improving medical working conditions whereas complements means that
aid gives incentives to South physicians to migrate.
The paper will proceed as follows: Section 2 gives a general review of the literature on the medical
brain drain. Then, Section 3 will present the analytical framework. Section 4 presents estimation
strategies and data; Section 5 reports findings and Section 6 concludes.
2 Review of Literature
2.1 Determinants of medical emigration
Even if the physicians’ emigration has take a large part in the debate of migration’s consequence,
few studies tried to investigate the determinants of these movements. Astor et al. (2005) has estab-
lished a questionnaire which ask questions about the motivation of migration decision, the working
conditions in health sector and policies which could be effective to improve physicians conditions.
In this part, we report only statistics concerning the migration decision. Their analyse is foccused
on 5 countries: India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Colombia and Philippines. 90,8% are attracted by the
desire for a higher income. This result go in favor to Harris and Todaro (1970). They stipulate that
migration is attracted by the differential between origin’s wage and the expected destination’s wage.
However another factors has an increasing importance in health sector is the working condi-
tions. In Astor and al’s survey, 74,1% of respondants want to have access to better techonology and
equipment. In the same way, Vujicic et al. (2004) discussed about the role of wage in two African
countries: Ghana and South Africa. They observed that the wage premium (ratio of destination
wage on the source wage) is about 22 between Ghana and the USA, it is only 4 for South Africa.
They expected that medical workers emigration is much lower in South Africa than in Ghana. Sur-
prisingly, the percentage of health care professionals who intend to migrate is quite similar (62%
in Ghana and 58% in South Africa). Vujicic et al. (2004) conclude that the correlation between
supply of health worker and the wage ratio is quite small. So policies which consist in increasing
the source wage will not reduce enough the huge wage differential to weaken health professionals
emigration rate. Better policies are those which improve the working and living conditions in
developing source countries. In this case, the higher HIV prevalence in South Africa explains the
same emigration rate with Ghana. Their policies proposition goes in favour of the effectivness of
health foreign aid in weakening medical emigration through the improvement of working conditions.
Awases et al. (2004) have made a survey on the migration of health professional in 6 African
countries: Cameroon, Ghana, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe. They observe an
increase in the number of migration of health workers which occured principally nurses. In 2002,
the intention to migrate is quite high in these countries ranging from 26,1% in Uganda to 68% in
Zimbabwe. The favorite destination countries are United Kingdom, the Unites States and France.
Further reasons are given by these health workers to explain their decision to emigrate or their
intention to migrate: Better remunerations (72% in Uganda), more perspective for training and
experience (85% in Cameroon) and because of poor management of lack of resources in health
services. Awases et al. (2004) show that countries where the HIV-AIDS prevalence are higher (in
their cases: South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe), the situation becomes more stressful for health
professionals.
In the same way, in countries where the health care system is basic and faces high epidemic
prevalence (HIV-AIDS, Tuberculosis, Malaria...), the medical brain drain is disastrous.
Bhargava and Docquier (2008) demonstrated that physicians’ emigration is explained by an in-
crease in HIV prevalence especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Their analysis is based on database
of medical emigration collected on census data and association data from the 16 biggest OECD
countries. In the first step, the medical emigration rate is explained by economic variables: GDP
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per capita, percent of secondary school enrollment, ratio of wage in home on wage in USA and by
health variables in particular HIV prevalence. Even if the wage ratio go in favour to migrants move
to countries where the expected wage are higher,one of their main results reveal, that a double of
HIV prevalence rate induces an increase of medical brain drain close to 80%.
2.2 Consequence of physicians’ emigration on sending countries
The migration research debate between ”‘brain drain”’ view and ”‘brain gain”’ view has been
transmitted to the health sector. In that way Winters et al. (2007) are even more pessimistic.
They focussed their analysis on the health sector, especially on the overseas doctors in the United
Kingdom. They specified two conditions for the brain drain to be beneficial:Firstly, as the ”‘brain
gain”’ theory claims, the incentive to migrate should have an impact on the education process, in
their paper on the medical training. Their survey and their calculations go against this assumption.
Secondly, migrants might not be strongly screened, because if the selection process is too hard,
almost everyone believe that they have no chance to be admitted by the host countries and so only
few people decide to invest in education. In developed countries, the admission process is very
strict and restricting.
Winters et al. (2007) questionnaire showed that none of these conditions is fulfilled and conclude
that the ”‘Brain Gain”’ hypothesis is not applicable in the health sector.
Defoort (2008) demonstrated that the ”‘Brain Gain”’ theory is verified in some countries. Her
econometric study found that it exist a convergence process to their long term equilibrium in term
of the number of health physicians. Secondly and the more important, the perspective to migrate
is positively correlated to the growth of number of physicians only in middle income countries.
Defoort (2008) explains this result by the liquidity constrain in low income countries which inhibit
the investment in medical education. This incentive effect seems to well operate into 2 regions:
Asia and Latin America. Finally the presence of pandemics such as Malaria deter the investment
in medical education. This paper goes in favor to the new approach of ”‘Brain gain”’ theory and
find positive incentive associated to the medical emigration. However, Sub-Saharan Africa seems to
have no incentive effect in acquiring medical education whereas it is this region where the situation
is alarming.
On the other side, Awases et al. (2004) showed the risks associated of quality and quantity of
medical education and training after large physicians emigration. This emigration cause problem
into the replacement of teacher in medical schools and into the quality of medical course because
the emigration of experienced medical teacher. Awases et al. (2004) cited the problem associated
to the cost of training medical professional. Because large part of medical training is subsidied
by governement, the emigration after their diploma obtention represent a large lost in term of
taxation. They proposed that developed countries have to participate into the educational medical
system in conterpart of the requirement of health professional from these developing countries.
Astor et al. (2005) asked also question about the characteristics of medical schooling and the
potential impact of physician’s migration on sending countries. 55,6% of interviewed professionals
think that medical schools provide number of specialized student in medecine which are used more
effective in other countries. Moreover, in Pakistan, Nigeria and Phillipines more than 50% are
agree with the fact that physicians’ emigration has led to insuficient physicians to meet the need
of population healthcare and so has not help to build the health system. According to ”‘Brain
gain’ theory, close to half respondants think that migration permits to increase the medical level
knowledge and education.
In the second step of their paper, Bhargava and Docquier (2008) use the medical brain drain to
explain the number of death due to HIV and the life expectancy by using a simultaneity equation
model. They found that a double increase of physicians’ emigration causes an increase of 20% of
death due to HIV a fortiori in countries where HIV prevalence is high (the threshold is about 3%).
Bhargava and Docquier (2008) propose to solve this vicious circle by implementing pilot program
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for the health sector and fighting HIV prevalence which pushes physicians to leave their country.
Chauvet et al. (2008) tried to compare the effect of remittances and health ODA in improving
the child mortality. It seems that health aid is effective in improving child health only in countries
under the threshold of $3225 income per capita. In upper countries, the health aid rises the child
mortality. Whereas, remittance per capita elasticities remains significantly negative whatever the
regression. Chauvet et al. (2008) go beyond the first specification, and try to evaluate the effect
of medical brain drain on the child mortality. And, as we expected, the lack of health care pro-
fessionals causes a big damage on the child health. In a descriptive statistics, aid to training and
education in health sector seems to be positively correlated to emigration rate in medical sector.
In other words, investing in health education creates incentives for medical students to go train-
ing and working abroad. Dayton Johnson and Katseli (2006) underlined the policy incoherence
between the foreign aid policy, particularly in health sector, and the immigration policy in OECD
countries.
3 Analytical Framework
relation.pdf
 
 
 
Physicians’ Emigration 
 
 
Health Foreign Assistance 
 
 
 
Death rate, crude (per 1,000 people) 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
Figure 1: Relationship between Health aid, Migration and Death Rate
We assume the following relationship existing between Health aid, Physicians emigration and
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working conditions (see Figure 1). (1) and (2) represent the direct impact between health aid
and physicians emigration and the reverse causality. This effect can be analysed by Three Stage
Least Squares method in our analysis. The (3) and (4) show the indirect impact of health foreign
assistance on the physicians emigrations rate through the death rate.
3.1 Direct Impact of Health Foreign Aid
Health foreign assistance can adopt different types of activities such as building hospitals and clin-
ics, assistance to specialised institutions such as those for tuberculosis, maternal and child care,
other medical and dental services, disease and epidemic control, vaccination programmes, nursing,
provision of drugs, health demonstration, public health administration and medical insurance pro-
grammes. It includes also training of physicians which corresponds to grants to students to realize
part of their scholarship in an OECD country (Chauvet et al. (2008)). It improves the mobility of
migrants and particularly physicians. This type of aid can change the expectation of physicians at
the end of their training which creates incentives for them to stay in the destination country after
their diploma and accelerates the emigration of health workers in the short term. Although the
mobility grants have the aim of increasing the international migration, origin’s countries expect
their health workforce will come back after educational duration. If migrations become permanent,
the mobility grants may have negative effects in the source countries. Many reasons can be cited:
Firstly, if the cost of education is supported by public funds, permanent migration will reduce social
return to education. Secondly, we expect that remittances or diaspora effects could compensate
this loss. But the effect of remittances on health in home countries is ambiguous (Adams (2006)).
On the other side, foreign aid can delay the migration decision for physicians. In fact, health
assistance create hope in labour conditions improvement. Obviously, if the situation is better than
before, it means that health assistance is effective and migration decision can be delayed to another
period or dropped. In health aid, part of it is devoted to drugs’ provision and medical equipments.
This kind of aid can permit to improve the working environment of medical doctors. Furthermore,
part of official development assistance take the form of technical assistance such as an expertise on
specific topic. These kind of aid in health sector can help physicians to work in better conditions
and then avoid them to migrate in fine. All these improvements into working conditions through
the financement of medical tools, equipement, or expertise for basic health is captured by health
aid and this type may have a completely different implications compared to mobility grants.
We can think also, that if we help health sector, all the ressources presented in source countries
included human capital will converge to the helped health sector rather than other health sector.
Typically, the health aid devoted to public health sector can improve the working conditions and
can compete with the private medical sector. Then, physicians in private sector can be attracted
by a public career which in turn improve the labour environnement. This ”‘vertuous circle”’ can
be announced by the arrival of health foreign assistance.
The impact of health aid may be different amoung time. Typically, in short term (before five
years), the direct impact of health assistance lies in activities with an immediate effect such as
grants for medicine students and medical specilisation or the furniture of medical tools or drugs.
But, in long term (more than five years), after the realisation of health infrastructures such as
hospitals, the construction of clinics... the impact of health assistance can be different1.
The relationship between physicians’ emigration and health aid can be positive if the destination
countries compensate the brain drain they generated by an increase of their level of health assistance
to these countries. Morover Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller (2000) have shown that diaspora in
destination countries may lobby to influence the allocation of aid. Berthe´le´my et al. (2008) show
that the presence of specific diaspora in OECD countries could influence the allocation of aid.
1Unfortunetely, due to data time limitations, we cannot test this hypothesis in this study
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3.2 Impact of Health Foreign Aid through improvement into epidemics
prevalence
Foreign aid in medical sector should permit a substantial improvement in working conditions, fi-
nances vaccination campaign to fight epidemics and should improve the labour environment of
doctors.Bhargava and Docquier (2008) show the importance of epidemics like HIV-AIDS in the
decisions of physician’s emigration. In fact, a high HIV prevalence rate deteriorates the safety of
care and creates high transmission risk for medical staff. Then, medical workforce have an addi-
tional incentive to migrate. As Bhargava and Docquier (2008) said, the emigration rate creates in
turn high death rate due to HIV because, in one hand, in developing countries the availability of
anti-retroviral treatment are quite low and , on the other hand, if the equipment and drugs are
available, the medical staff is not sufficently presented to nurse patients infected by the HIV-AIDS
virus. So, health foreign assistance can have an indirect effect via the combat against diseases to
retains health emigration. The problem is how can we measure it? The HIV prevalence rates as
used by Bhargava and Docquier (2008), can be a good proxy for this. However, HIV data is not
available annually from 1995 to 2003 and this statistic is not completely reported for countries
where the prevalence rate is high. So we prefer to approximate epidemics prevalence rate as the
death rate crude per 1000 people. This variable is quite well reported in our analysis accross time
period and accross countries. In fact, where the death rate is high, we may suppose that epidemics
is highly present. The advantage of this variable is that it embodies all diseases which developing
countries faced. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, HIV-AIDS causes big damage. With high
HIV-AIDS transmission, other types of diseases reappeared such as tuberculosis because sick per-
sons suffer of a loss of immunization, consequently, they contract others diseases. Because this
region is geographycally in a tropical area, the climate conditions is favourable to the proliferation
of mosquitos, in particular Plasmodium falciparum species which increases the malaria transmis-
sion risks. Death rate includes death due to these big pandemics but also other death due to less
fatal diseases such as measles, diphteria, tetanus and pertussis.2
Our econometric analysis can give the genuine effect of aid, especially in health sector, on the
physicians’ emigration rate, directly or indirectly, controlling for others factors.
4 Data and Empirical issues
4.1 Data and descriptive statistics
The medical brain drain dataset of Bhargava and Docquier (2007) covers 192 source countries to
16 OCDE countries during the period of 1991 to 2004. These 16 OCDE destinations countries are
the most important doctor immigration countries (nearly 75%, see Bhargava and Docquier (2007)).
These countries of destination are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and
United States. Our analysis is focused only on the time period between 1995 and 2003 because
our health aid database and all others variables are available only for this period. Medical brain
drain is defined as the part of physicians educated in their countries but working abroad. We keep
as dependant variable, the rate of medical brain drain which is denoted Mij ,t. Mij ,t is defined
as the stock of physicians from country i working abroad in country j and Pi, t is the number of
physicians working at home i at time t and
∑16
j=1(Mij ,t) is the sum of migration stocks between i
and all destinations countries j.
2Notice that retaining medical staff in health sector can have positive impact on population welfare and specifically
on the reduction of mortality (Bhargava and Docquier (2008) and Chauvet et al. (2008)). In fact, the presence of
health staff should permit developing countries to faced diseases and finally reduced deaths and so improve the
working conditions. Notice that the opposite is possible. If health aid cannot permit to improve the health working
condition, then emigration rate continue and mortality will be higher which in turn deteriorate the labour conditions.
In order to simplify the specification, we will not investigate these correlations. The allocation of health aid can be
different for countries where the death rate is higher. Even if aid allocation is influenced by ”‘self-interest”’ factors
(see Berthe´le´my (2003)), a higher death rate could change the aid distribution As previous, and because instruments
are difficult to be found, we will not focussed on this issue.
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Medical brain drain rate is then defined by the following equation:
MBDij ,t = Mij ,t/(Pi,t +
∑16
j=1(Mij ,t))
We prefer the rate rather than stocks of physicians emigration for dependant variable because
the absolute value is not taking into account the physicians population staying at home.
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics of the level of medical brain drain. Some interesting figures
can be raised out:
Firstly, small countries or islands are most affected by medical brain drain. For example, in
2003, the average rate of medical brain drain in small countries is around 14%. In Carabean islands
like Grenada and Dominica the rate of medical brain drain is above 90% in 2003 which explains the
higher medical brain drain in this region. Notice that in Pacific island, the situation is equivalent.
Secondly, Low income countries face high emigration rate in health staff. This phenomenom is
quite worrying because it is in this part of the world that the number of physicians per 1000 people
is the lowest. For exmple, In Sub Saharan Africa, the number of physicians for 1000 people is 0,16
and but the emigration’s rate of physicians is equal to 16.4% in 2003 which is the highest rate in
the world. These huge outflows of health care professional cause shortage in sending developing
countries which creates hard rise in mortality rate.
Official Development Assistance(ODA) database on health sector is extracted from the Coun-
try Reporting System (CRS) database which is provided from Development Assistance Commit-
tee(DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Health sector
includes assistance to hospitals and clinics, assistance to specialised institutions such as those for
tuberculosis, maternal and child care, other medical and dental services, disease and epidemic
control, vaccination programmes, nursing, provision of drugs, health demonstration, public health
administration and medical insurance programmes.
In our analysis, we focused only on the health aid commitments expressed in constant dollars
in 2006 rather than disbursement3. However CRS database begins from 1995 until recent period
which constrains our study to begin in 1995. Moreover, large part of CRS database is composed
of missing data in health sector. It can mean either that donors are not giving any health aid at
the period considering or the donors are giving health aid but it was not reported. That’s why
these missing data are dropped from the analysis rather than considered as zero health aid. In
dropping our missing data, our database is not really a panel data because some pairs of countries
(we are in a bilateral analysis empirical issue) only appear in discontinuous way across the time.
So our database permits us to realize pooled analysis (with different periods but with different
country-pair across the time) rather than genuine panel data analysis with fixed or random fixed
effect.
Figure 1 deals with the evolution of total Official Development Assistance (ODA) commitment
and the specific ODA in the health sector. During 1995 and 1998, global ODA and health aid
have not changed and keep, respectively, around 4 billions and 2 billions. However, after 1998,
foreign aid increases gradually until 2003 to 70 billions US Dollars. Health assistance goes from 2
billions to 3 billions in 2003. These net increases go in paralell with the adoption of Development
Millenium Goals in 2000 to eradicate poverty and fighting epidemics in health sector.
3Disbursement is underreported compared to commitments which provide not enough data for an econometric
analysis
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Table 1: Physicians Distribution accross country group
1995 Physicians Emigration Rate Nb Physicians per 1000 people
Population Size
small (pop<2.5m) 12% 0.88
lower middle (2.5m<pop<10m) 8% 1.50
upper middle (10m<pop<25m) 6% 1.52
large (pop>25m) 2% 1.35
Income group (WB Classification)
Low Income 6.2% 0.08
lower middle income 2.1% 0.78
upper middle income 3.1% 1.39
high income 3.8% 1.82
Geography
East Asia - Pacific 1.1% 0.65
Europe - Central Asia 0.7% 2.95
Latin America - Carribean 2.4% 1.18
Middle East - North Africa 5.5% 1.25
OECD 3.9% 2.64
South Asia 8.5% 0.27
Sub-Saharan Africa 16.8% 0.15
2003 Physicians Emigration Rate Nb Physicians per 1000 people
Population Size
small (pop<2.5m) 14% 0.99
lower middle (2.5m<pop<10m) 7% 1.61
upper middle (10m<pop<25m) 5% 1.64
large (pop>25m) 2% 1.48
Income group (WB Classification)
Low Income 14.1% 0.99
lower middle income 6.6% 1.61
upper middle income 5.0% 1.64
high income 2.4% 1.48
Geography
East Asia - Pacific 1.0% 0.72
Europe - Central Asia 1.1% 2.90
Latin America - Carribean 2.3% 1.37
Middle East - North Africa 5.7% 1.52
OECD 3.6% 2.94
South Asia 7.7% 0.36
Sub-Saharan Africa 16.4% 0.16
Notes: Author Computations from Bhargava and Docquier (2007) dataset.
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4.2 Empirical Models
4.2.1 Simultaneous Equation for Direct and Indirect Impact
We analyse the effect of foreign aid in health sector on the medical brain drain all over the world.
We follow Mayda (2005), and specify a bilateral ”‘gravity equation model”’. Then, we add health
foreign assistance. We expect that health foreign aid may affect the physicians’ brain drain through
a reverse causality. So, we use a system of simultaneous equations with Three-Stage Least Squares
(3SLS) method.
This methodology has many advantages:
-Firstly, it decomposes the reverse causality because dependant variable in one equation appears
in right-hand side (as explicative variables) in other equations.
- Secondly, in 3SLS, the endogeneity is taking into account through the introduction of exclusion
variables which appear in one equation but not elsewhere. These exclusion variables are extremely
important because there are used as intrumental variables for the endogeneous variables. Good
instruments permit to control for endogeneity, that’s why we reported in our analysis, test of va-
lidity of instruments for our exclusion variables.
-Thirdly, 3SLS, rather than 2SLS, takes into account the disturbance between residual in different
equations.
-Finally, the simultaneous equations framework give the possibility to incorporate other equations
as channels transmissions.
All variables in all specifications are expressed in logarithm except colony, common language
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and contiguity dummies for interpretation as elasticities. The estimated system of equation is the
following:
MBDij ,t = α0 + β1Yi,t + β2Healthaidij ,t + β3Xmbd,t + uij ,t (1)
Healthaidij ,t = α0 + β1Yi,t + β2MBDij ,t + β3Xh,t + uij ,t (2)
where:
(i) is the country of origin, (j) is country of destination, (ij) represents pair of countries and (t) is
the year.
Differents α0 in equations is defined as the constant. MBDij ,t is our dependant variable which
is the physicians emigration rate occured in home country (i) to destination country (j) at time
(t). Healthaidij ,t is our interested explanatory variable which is the foreign assistance devoted to
health received by the country of origin (i) and given by donors (j) at time (t).
Yi,t correspond to common variables which appear into both equations. We incorporate vari-
ables which appears traditionnaly into ”‘gravity equation model”’ such as:
Gdp is the gross domestic products per capita in PPP. 4 Pop is the population in total. All these
variables are provided by the World Development Indicator 2006 from the World Bank.
Distance is the simple distance in kilometers between the source most populated cities and
the destination most populated cities. Language is dummy variable for sharing common official
primary language. Colony represents dummy variable for have ever been in colonial relationship.
Finally, Contiguity is a dummy variable equal to 1 if contiguity occurs for country-pairs. These
variables are extracted from Mayer and Zignago (2006).
Political is defined as the ICRG political index which varies from 0 to 100 points and consider
different kind of political stability: Government Stability, Socioeconomic conditions, Investment
profile, Internal Conflict, External Conflict, Corruption, Military in Politics, Religion in Politics,
Law and Order, Ethnic Tensions, Democratic Accountability, Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG (2004)).
Higher points mean that political risk are low and lower points mean that political risk are high.
These data are coming from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database.
To decompose the global effect of health aid on migration, we identified simultaneous equation
model where we included transmission channels in another equation. Because our first specification
is on bilateral analysis, we cannot introduced the death rate in origin’s countries itself as dependant
variables. Then we aggregated physicians migration and health aid by each destination countries.
Then, we obtained:
16∑
j=1
(Mij ,t) = α0 + β1Yi,t + β2Death− ratei,t + ui,t (3)
Death− ratei,t = α0 + β1Yi,t5 + β2
16∑
j=1
Healthaidij ,t + β3Xz,t + ui,t (4)
16∑
j=1
Healthaidij ,t = α0 + β1Yi,t + β2Xh,t + ui,t (5)
Where Death− ratei,t is the death rate crude per 1000 people (expressed in logarithm). This
channel can be influenced by health aid that’s why, health aid variable appears in the right hand
4GDP is a proxy of wage which have an important role in migration decision (Harris and Todaro (1970))
5In death rate equation, Yi,t include only Gdp per capita in origin’s countries
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side into the channels equations.6 These dataset are provided by the World Development Indicator
2006 from the World Bank. Because in developing countries, differents kind of diseases occured,
it is very difficult to select one specific prevalence rate rather than another one. The advantage in
taking the death rate as a proxy is that it cover all diseases which occured in developing countries.
A high prevalence in one disease could lead to an increase into death rate in fine. However, because
our transmission channel is not perfect, death rate will not captured situations where the prevalence
rate is high for non-fatal diseases and so where working conditions are also hard (this effect will
be capture by health aid variable itself).
uij ,t and ui,t are error terms.
4.2.2 Exclusion Variables
In each equation, we have to introduced exclusion variables to well specified the system. These
variables are like ”‘instruments”’ in a Two-Stage-Least Square. Their characteristics is to be
correlated to the dependant variable but not to the interested variables.
In our case, Xmbd,t represents to exclusion variables related to destination health sector treated
as instruments for medical brain drain. In Xmbd,t, we incorporate variables which are correlated
with medical brain drain but not to health aid. Because we are in a bilateral analysis, we can use
variables which are coming from the destination side (j) related to migration but not to foreign aid
specifically in health sector. We have identified 3 instruments:
Physicians per 1000-d corresponds to the number of physicians per 1000 people in destination
country (j). These variables are provided by Bhargava and Docquier (2007). Pop65-d is the per-
centage of population over 65 years old in destination country (j) and Health Expenditure-d , the
total of health expenditure expressed in percentage of GDP in destination countries. OECD Health
Database give us this information. These variables are well correlated to health system and give
a good idea of the functionning, the need of care, and the environment in OECD countries. They
explain quite well the health sector in the demand side but are no correlated to the amount of
health aid giving by OECD countries. No substitutions or complementarities exist between the
domestic health system status and the health international cooporation toward overseas countries.
Xh,t represents exclusion variables related to recipient characteristics treated as instruments
for health aid distribution.In Xh,t, we denoted exclusion variables in health aid distribution. Be-
cause we know that donors are very sensitive to the economic and financial situations of recipient
countries, we identified 3 instruments:
Economic expresses the ICRG economic index. It is based on 50 points. And the interpretation
is as political index: the higher is the index, the lower is the risk. It incorporates different aspects
of the economic status of a country at a given time such as: GDP per head, Real GDP growth,
annual inflation rate, budget balance and current account. Because in our analysis, the GDP per
capita is added next to this index, so the economic index is taking more into account the 3 last
indicators like inflation, budget balance and current account. Financial represents ICRG financial
index. It is based also on 50 points. Financial index includes foreign debt, foreign debt service,
current account, net international liquidity, and exchange rate stability. Budget corresponds The
total budget of the donors.
Tavares (2003) showed that the budget of donors and its interaction with geographical and cul-
tural proximity are good instruments to aid allocation. In the same order, we use donor budget and
other variables which expressed purely financial and economic situations of the recipients countries.
Statistical measures as economic and financial country risks have no direct impact on the decision
to migrate for medical doctor but it can well explained the aid distribution accross countries.In
Equation 5, health aid exclusions variables are the budget of 2 donors: France and United Kingdom.
6Notice that, we are trying to extract the HIV-AIDS prevalence or the proportion of people who receive an-
tiretroviral treatment, but not enough data are available for my time-period econometric analysis.
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As before, Xz,t corresponds to exclusion variables related to death rate equation. It embodies
the tuberculosis incidence per 100000 people and the ICRG financial risk in equation 4. Because our
analysis is based on the time period from 1995-2003, no pandemics annually data were available
except for tuberculosis. The second variable can be viewed as a proxy for social governement
expenditures. Where the financial risk is high, debts are important and part of governement
budget is devoted to reimbursement and few funds are invested into social infrastructures.
5 Empirical Results
Firstly, we propose a direct estimation of the health foreign aid on the physicians emigration rates
in bilateral framework. It corresponds to the estimation of the system of equation (1) and (2). We
thus decompose the impact between transmission channel which is the estimation of simultaneous
equation (4), (5) and (6).
Table 2 and Table 3 present the direct impact into bilateral model and then Table 4 presents
the indirect effect through the death rate.
5.1 OLS estimation of physicians emigration equation
Table 2 presents the OLS estimation between health aid and physicians emigration rates (column
1) and then we add the transmission channel (column 2). In column 3 and 4, we used Two Stage
Least Squares to control for endogeneity, respectively health aid and physicians emigration rate by
theirs instruments.
Firstly the Gdp per capita in the origin’s countries has a significant and negative impact on
the physicians emigration rate. So migration is important in poor regions, typically Sub-Saharan
Africa, as we have seen in descriptive statistics. So when the Gdp per capita is low, the wage
potential earned in home countries is low and the working conditions will be risky, so the incentive
to migrate is high. In the poorest countries, few people have the ability to migrate, because the
cost of migration is too high and due to liquidity constrain. However, physicians are upper socio-
professional occupation in developing countries and the migration cost is easily supported by them.
The big host countries are those with the higher GDP per capita in OECD countries even if the
GDP-d appear with negative sign only into the two first columns. Probably, in these countries, the
level of wage is quite higher than in other OECD countries. The wage differential across countries
are very large in particular for physicians. For example, in 1997, the monthly wage of physicians
in Ivory Coast is $311 compared with $284 for Philippines which is in turn lower than the $5724
earnings in the United States. We know that GDP per capita captures various effects other than
wage7 Notice that the elasticities associated to this variable is relatively large. In column 3, if
we increased the Gdp-d to 1% the physicians emigration rate increase to almost 3%. As Mayda
(2005), the demand side is a big determinant of the migration in general and it remains significant
specifically in health sector.
For the population, the higher is the population in receiving countries, the lower is the physi-
cians emigration rate. This findings confirm our descriptive statistics that the emigration rate is
high for islands where the population is quite small whereas larger countries send more doctors in
stock in average but it represents low physicians rate.
Doctors seem to be attracted to countries where the population is high. The higher is the
population in destination countries, the larger would be the need of care, the bigger will the health
7We try to carry out in our analyses the source-country wage for general physicians from Occupational Wage
Around the World database(OWW) compiled by Freeman and Oostendorp (2000). The database provides monthly
wage for 161 occupations and 137 countries between 1983 to 2003. These informations come from ILO October
Inquiry data (Oostendorp (2005)). When we include the wage country-specific calibration for general physicians
expressed in US $ for source and host country, the sample is not large enough for our econometric analysis.
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system and finally the higher will be the probability for them to be employed.
Distance has a negative effect. Physicians’ emigration, as general migration, would affect close
countries because the distance is a proxy for migration cost even if the migration cost is lower
for skilled migrants (like physicians). It is likely that a higher distance means a higher cost of
transportation, information cost, psychological cost and a higher duration of unemployment in the
received countries.
Migration is not only an economical phenomenon but it responds to a common culture or
history between two countries. That’s why historical and socio-cultural variables as to share a
common language or have ever been in a colonial relationship increase medical brain drain. These
variables are usually used to capture the cultural proximity between the source and the host coun-
tries. Sharing the same language is an important composent for medical occupations which is based
essentially on the communication between patient and caregiver. Having ever been in a colonial
relationship can mean that cooperation (in trade, financial capital, foreign direct investment, for-
eign assistance)between both countries is important.
The working conditions in receiving countries influence the migration process. This is taking
into account by the number of physicians per 1000 people and the population over 65 years old
into the destination’s countries. The coefficient associated with density of physicians per 1000
people is strongly negative and significant into the Two and the Three Stage Least Squares. In
other words, where the number of physicians per 1000 people is low in destination countries, the
higher is the physicians’ emigration rate toward these countries. So shortages in receiving countries
in health sector are combined with immigration of physicians coming from developing countries
(OECD (2008b)). And when the population over 65 years old is important, the lower will be the
physicians immigration. This is quite alarming because health workforce is not distributed pro-
portionnaly to the need of care. Countries where the population gets older do not attract more
physicians migrants. The United States, Canada, and Australia are the largest receiving countries
whereas their population over 65 years old is around 10%. In Denmark, Norway, Germany and
Belgium the part of population over 65 years old are above 15% and these countries are not the
”‘top importers”’ of health migrant.
Finally, the health foreign aid is introduced in column 1 and appears with significant positive
sign. In other word, country which is receiving more health aid from donor, will see his emigration
rate of doctor become more important toward this donor. This interpretation goes in favour to
Chauvet et al. (2008) which explain the positive correlation between health aid and physicians
emigration rate by significant part of grants attributed to physicians for specialisation into OECD
countries. In column 2, we added the death rate and found a significantly positive correlation with
migration. In presence of transmission channel, health assistance become unsignificant. Health
aid may have effect on health care emigration rate, indirectly through the improvement of working
conditions. However, the causality between health aid and physicians migration can be reverse
and omitted variables can biaised the regression. That’s why in column 3, we instrumented health
assistance to control for the endogeneity problem. Because the correlation between physicians and
health aid can occur in the opposite way, we instrumented health migration in the column 4.
5.2 Direct Impact Between Health aid and Migration in IV and 3SLS
Methods
In column 3 of table 1, instrumental variables are used to implement the health aid. The ICRG
economic index, the financial risk and the budget of donor are the instrumental variables. We
check the relevance and validity of instruments by the Hansen test which is equal to 0.86 and the
F-test associated to instruments is significantly equal to 10,36. The correlation between health
aid and physicians emigration rate become significantly negative. So health aid has a negative
direct impact on the physicians emigration rates. It would reduce emigration and not boost it.
The elasticity associated to health aid is -1.16%. In other words, if health aid increase to 1%,
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the physicians emigration rate decrease to 1,16%. It can be explained by the fact that mobility
grants attributed to student’s training is not important enough to impact positively the migration
process. It seems that the physicians migration decisions is delayed or dropped when the health
aid arrive due to the improvement in working conditions. In fact, health aid embodies such big
infrastructures in health sector as hospital, clinics etc... but finance lots of drugs provisions and
equipments. It finances prevention campaign which is prevent population against diseases. It can
also take the form of technical assistance or expertise for one specific way. All these types of aid
permit to build capacity into health sector and improve gradually the working conditions of health
professionals.
In column 4, instrumental variables method is used to implement the physicians emigration
rate. We used the exclusion variables such as the number of physicians per 1000 people and the
proportion of 65 years old into the destination countries. The Hansen test does not reject the
validity of instruments (0.86) and the F-Test is significantly equal to 68,31. In this case, physicians
emigration rates have a positive impact on the amount of health aid received by the home countries.
In other words, donors compensate origin countries of physicians for the losses of human capital
which are attracted in OECD countries. The elasticities of physicians emigration rate is close to
0.5%. Notice that the higher is the Gdp of recipients, the lower is the amount of health aid. Aid is
distributed in priority to poorest countries. The bigger is the population of origin and the higher is
the health assistance. Surprisingly, health aid is negatively affected by common language whereas
it is positively correlated to distance, colony and politics. According to Berthe´le´my (2003) and
Burnside and Dollar (2000), aid allocation is very sensitive to the governance level and historical
link.
In Table 3, we reported the simultaneous equation system with the method of Three-Stage Least
Squares. In the column 1 and 2 we reported, respectively, the physicians emigration equation and
the distribution of health aid. We observed exactly the same results as previously. Health aid has
negative impact on the medical brain drain but high emigration in health sector causes an increase
in amount of health assistance. More emigration in health sector can be viewed as countries where
the need in health care is critical, that is why donors gives more health aid where the need of care
is unsatisfied. In column 3 and 4, we checked if our result is robust to the introduction of health
expenditure in destination countries in migration equation and contiguity dummy in migration
and aid equation. The results do not change: health aid is negatively associated to physicians
migration but the reverse causlity is positive. The improvement into working conditions seems to
be the better explanation for the interpretation of health aid coefficient. Notice that when OECD
governement spends more into their national health sector , it permits to improve the health system
in OECD countries and attract physicians coming from ”‘South”’ countries. This interpretation
is confirmed by the positive sign attributed to health expenditure variable. The contiguity of a
country is important for the physicians migration. This is particularly the case for the physicians
emigration between Mexico and United States. The physicians emigration rates is around 8%
whereas it is around 3% for the Honduras. It is also the case for the contiguity between Austria
and Slovenia.
5.3 Indirect Impact Between Health aid and Migration in 3SLS Method
In Table 4, we introduced the death rate as explanatory variables to capture the direct effect of
health aid and the possible indirect effect through epidemics channels. In the two first columns,
death rate is explanatory variable only into migration equation. In the two second, death rate is
viewed as common variable in both equations. As expected, death rate appears with a positive and
significant coefficient for physicians migration but remains unsignificant for the allocation of health
aid. It means that health aid have a direct negative impact on physicians migration other than
through the improvement of death rate. So death rate well measures the epidemics’ prevalence
in source countries. Because the working conditions can be improve without real change into the
death rate. For example, health aid can increase the hospital capacity or the technical knowledge
of personnel. In that case, working conditions for medical workers is improved but it have not
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automaticaly an impact on death rate. We hope that, but nothing is guaranteed. In table 4, the
health aid elasticities is higher (-1.89) than before (-1.15) which is surprising because we extracted
the indirect effect via death rate. One possible explanation is due to the different size of sample (in
table 4, 1420 and in table 3, 2179). If we regress the specification in table 3 on the sample of 1420,
we have a significant elacticity of -1.99 for health aid without death rate variable. So the main
effect of health aid is a negative direct impact. This effect is reduced in presence of death rate.
So we can think that health aid have an indirect impact on physicians migration through death rate.
In Table 5, we estimate the indirect impact by introducing the transmission channels into the
specification. The column 1 explains the medical doctor migration by the death-rate. In the column
2, the death rate is explained by health aid. Finally, the third column explain the determinants of
aid allocation.
In the first column, the death rate is significantly positive. In other words, where the death rate is
high, the proportion of doctors emigrants will be higher. The elasticities associated to this coeffi-
cient is close to 0.8%, which means that an improvement into death rate and in the fight against big
epidemics such as HIV-AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria can effectively reduce physicians emigra-
tion. According to Bhargava and Docquier (2008), countries, which face high epidemics rates, have
higher risk transmission for population and further for medical staff. This phenomenom creates
big incentives for them to emigrate.
In the second column, the death rate is explained by our interested variable: health aid. We
added as exclusion variables, the tuberculosis prevalence rate and financial risk8. As expected,
tuberculosis prevalence rate appears with a positive sign whereas financial risk appeared with neg-
ative sign. It goes in favor to big improvement of immunisation rate to retain physicians in fine.
Health aid appears significantly negative in this regression which confirms the hypothesis that the
indirect impact of health assistance is also negative. The elasticities of this variable is -0.041%.
Part of health aid devoted to epidemics programs, prenvention, treatment and vaccination would
lead to nurse population infected which reduced the death rate. Notice that the sample becomes
smaller due to the aggregation of our database accross destination countries.
In the third column, the health foreign assistance is explained by common variables and specific
exclusion variables as explanatory variables. Health aid is proportionnal to the amount of budget
of two donors: France and United Kingdom. The political situation of countries is more important
into the strategy of donor’s bilateral allocation. Where these risks are low, donors have incentive to
give more assistance because in these situation the governance is quiet good to used these financial
flows in an appropriate way (Burnside and Dollar (2000)). However where we does not distinguish
between destination countries, governance has much less importance into the allocation of foreign
aid and it is more determined by the need of recipients countries typically where the poverty level
is high and where population is higher (Berthe´le´my (2003)).
So if we compute the indirect elasticities of health aid on medical brain drain, we obtain -
0.03276. So increasing health aid to 1% allows to reduce physicians emigration rate to 0.03% via
the fighting against epidemics which is approximate by the death rate. According to the size of the
coefficient, a big rise into health foreign aid is needed to get real impact. Because both effects (the
direct (table 4 column 1) and the indirect effect (Table 5)) are coming from different database, it
would be difficult to add them. But what we can say is that the global effect of health assistance is
negatively associated to physicians migration. The global elasticities associated is -1.31% included
the epidemics channels (and around -2% in specific cases). Finally, the global impact of aid is
high enough. Notice that increasing the fighting against big diseases like HIV-AIDS, Malaria and
Tuberculosis permits to retains part of medical staff in source countries.
This analysis confirms our first results:
8If we considered these two variables as instruments in a Two-Stage Least Square, validity test is accepted. The
F-test and partial R-Squared show us that these exclusions variables is valid (respectively 46.70*** and 0.2702 for
heath aid equation and 49.80*** and 0.0881 for physicians’ emigration equation) and hence the Sargan test validate
the quality of our instruments in our case (respectively 0.9219 for health aid equation and 0.5888 for physicians’
emigration equation.
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1) The health foreign assistance has a strongly negative impact on the physicians emigration
rate. The direct impact of health aid remains significant and negative. So health foreign aid delays
the migration decision and maybe give some medical equipment and drugs permit to work in better
conditions but this is not capture by the death rate.
2) Health foreign assistance has an indirect impact through improvement in death rate which
permit to reduce medical brain drain. The epidemics prevalence plays an important role to retain
doctors and where the situations are alarming, the medical brain drain is amplified and destroying.
The elasticity associated with global impact of health assistance is relatively high (-1,31%). So
donors have to increase few foreign assistance devoted to health sector in order to expect a real
decrease in medical brain drain.
3) Finally, countries which face huge emigration of doctor, would see the amount of health
foreign assistance increase. In fact, donors are very sensitive to the health need care in ”‘South”’
countries. Health emigration is a proxy of the health status in these countries. So the medical
emigration create incentives for donors to increase the health assistance in order to compensate
the lost of these medical human capital. Furthermore, we know that diaspora creates pression on
OECD governements to allocate large proportion of aid (in health sector in our case) to their home
countries. The presence of physicians is extremely important for the effectiveness of any treatment
or in vaccination campaigns against diseases.
6 Conclusions
The importance of medical professional staff, in particular physicians, in achieving the Millenium
Development Goals in health outcome is well established. Policymakers have argued that increas-
ing the health development assistance could attained these objectives. However, health system
needs both infrastructure in health and human ressources as doctors, nurses and others speciali-
ties. Health ODA increases, incontestably, the health capital and infrastructure but what about
the health human capital? Our bilateral analysis seems to show that health foreign assistance is
a good tool for retaining the doctor emigration through the improvement of working conditions.
Notice that the magnitude of health elasticity is quite high. So we have to increase health ODA
by a small amount to lead substancial retainment into medical health professionals.
Physicians emigration, in all our analysis, is detrimental to the improvement of epidemics preva-
lence rate through death rate. It is also important in the distribution of health aid given by the
donors.
An important element to retain medical workers is to improve the working conditions in the
hospitals and clinics. Great equipment and fight epidemics such as malaria, HIV-AIDS and tuber-
culosis are effective in the improvement of physicians environnement and health assistance can be
beneficial to attain these objectives. Health aid can play a major role in these improvements if the
amount is substancial and regular. Reducing health aid would be disastrous for the advancement
accomplished during several years and for the achievement of Millenium Development Goals into
health sector adopted in 2000. International community, through bilateral and multilateral agen-
cies ,NGO and, of course, the governement of recipient countries itself should focussed attention
on Sub-Saharan Africa where the supply of health care is largely unsufficient.
Another possible fruitful policy, reported in OECD (2008b), in reducing medical flows is to
focus on the demand side. OECD countries should be careful to the origin of the medical health
professional if final goal is to improve development process in developing countries. As in the United
Kingdom, a new code of conduct, elaborated by UK’s National Health Service and the Common-
wealth, advise to limit the host of overseas doctor coming from the developing countries. In an
ethical view, it is difficult to retain these people in their home countries whereas they want to move.
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Even if OECD’s countries face shortages in health staff, these countries would be careful to not
”‘export”’ these shortages into developing countries (OECD (2008b)) even less, in regions where
the number of physicians compared to population is low. Different mechanisms of monitoring and
assessment have to be implement to have visibility about recruitment and can anticipate the po-
tential risk associated to these management.
OECD countries would not consider the requirement of their health staff as a national policies
(OECD (2008b)). Today, with the integration of labour market accross the world, requirement
adopted in one country can affect other countries at the end. Depriving these regions to their
health staff, where diseases infect large part of population, may be dangereous for developing pop-
ulation but also for developed countries in the case of pandemics infection and transmission on an
international level.
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Table 2: OLS and IV Estimation - Direct Impact
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
physician-mig physician-mig physician-mig health-aid
gdpo -0.42024 -0.24815 -1.00917 -0.30583
(0.05341)*** (0.07464)*** (0.15395)*** (0.08065)***
gdpd -0.48422 -0.48308 2.8195 1.45669
(0.27849)* (0.34334) (0.89208)*** (0.43473)***
popo -0.48999 -0.50014 -0.2325 0.44876
(0.02632)*** (0.03040)*** (0.07284)*** (0.06460)***
popd 0.64571 0.67897 1.17032 -0.62479
(0.03011)*** (0.03783)*** (0.12580)*** (0.18179)***
dist -0.38044 -0.35417 -0.3723 0.17938
(0.06379)*** (0.07973)*** (0.12845)*** (0.09608)*
common language 1.48927 1.45957 1.4983 -0.57063
(0.10225)*** (0.13740)*** (0.18616)*** (0.23536)**
colony 1.32781 1.45478 3.40958 0.99299
(0.15156)*** (0.20107)*** (0.53071)*** (0.23526)***
politic -0.51446 -0.47295 -0.2546 0.58362
(0.21415)** (0.29048) (0.41904) (0.32287)*
physicians1000d 0.32906 0.30344 -0.68048
(0.16764)** (0.22628) (0.36330)*
pop65d -4.44184 -4.51388 -4.47486
(0.37354)*** (0.47683)*** (0.70369)***
economic -0.61382
(0.29718)**
financial 0.45702
(0.30837)
budget 1.00668
(0.14982)***
health-aid 0.05107 0.02645 -1.15972
(0.01619)*** (0.02052) (0.25667)***
death-rate 0.49191
(0.12349)***
physician-mig 0.47777
(0.11738)***
Constant 15.73766 12.67005 -27.9888 -18.44178
(3.60605)*** (4.68127)*** (11.90340)** (5.37710)***
Observations 2179 1420 2179 2179
R-squared 0.56 0.58 0.81 0.25
endogeneous variable healthcst physician-mig
instruments economic physicians1000d
financial pop65d
budget
F-Test 10.33*** 66.25***
Hansen test 0.9304 0.8748
Notes:(i.)Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii.)* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3: 3SLS Estimation - Direct Impact
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS
physician-mig health-aid physician-mig health-aid
gdpo -1.0038 -0.31317 -1.27031 -0.33963
(0.14501)*** (0.07856)*** (0.17196)*** (0.07649)***
gdpd 2.77765 1.44538 3.08218 1.62037
(0.79080)*** (0.39727)*** (0.88900)*** (0.37992)***
popo -0.23482 0.44411 -0.12458 0.4062
(0.06725)*** (0.06185)*** (0.07892) (0.05916)***
popd 1.16466 -0.62509 1.21248 -0.51403
(0.11468)*** (0.16780)*** (0.12947)*** (0.15689)***
dist -0.37113 0.18343 -0.32913 0.16229
(0.12258)*** (0.08893)** (0.14282)** (0.08662)*
contiguity 4.756 -0.28233
(1.60616)*** (1.02346)
common language 1.49638 -0.57257 1.57596 -0.41719
(0.19042)*** (0.23915)** (0.21978)*** (0.22576)*
colony 3.39864 0.99258 4.36577 1.10114
(0.48934)*** (0.22987)*** (0.58777)*** (0.22155)***
politic -0.25573 0.54764 -0.19552 0.50897
(0.41777) (0.31814)* (0.48533) (0.30880)*
physicians1000d -0.64214 -1.16721
(0.30270)** (0.33740)***
pop65d -4.52228 -3.8987
(0.62786)*** (0.67965)***
health-expd 2.03727
(0.48557)***
economic -0.58835 -0.48639
(0.27005)** (0.23418)**
financial 0.54231 0.42181
(0.26103)** (0.22450)*
budget 1.00599 0.93642
(0.13730)*** (0.13140)***
health-aid -1.1483 -1.65668
(0.23322)*** (0.27535)***
physician-mig 0.47817 0.39279
(0.11163)*** (0.10363)***
Constant -27.37493 -18.44866 -37.92488 -20.93793
(10.30506)*** (4.92912)*** (11.35439)*** (4.67195)***
Observations 2179 2179 2179 2179
Notes:(i.)Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii.)* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4: 3SLS Estimation - Direct Impact
(1) (2) (3) (4)
physician-mig health-aid physician-mig health-aid
gdpo -1.25881 -0.41979 -1.20675 -0.39028
(0.24366)*** (0.09667)*** (0.25390)*** (0.10388)***
gdpd 3.32497 1.59002 3.35716 1.62797
(1.17234)*** (0.45374)*** (1.16913)*** (0.45449)***
popo 0.01855 0.4626 0.02522 0.45673
(0.12486) (0.07444)*** (0.12462) (0.07452)***
popd 1.27832 -0.46804 1.28156 -0.43641
(0.17891)*** (0.18797)** (0.17858)*** (0.19185)**
dist -0.31782 0.12624 -0.32531 0.11317
(0.18704)* (0.10319) (0.18732)* (0.10418)
contiguity 5.38376 -0.11395 5.40253 -0.01586
(1.78359)*** (1.08096) (1.78313)*** (1.08423)
common language 1.45155 -0.42355 1.43305 -0.40774
(0.31096)*** (0.28010) (0.31200)*** (0.27964)
colony 4.97588 1.15732 4.9655 1.19554
(0.83887)*** (0.27941)*** (0.83733)*** (0.28281)***
politic 0.50816 0.90577 0.60199 0.95824
(0.72360) (0.41217)** (0.73341) (0.41524)**
physicians1000d -1.48986 -1.46265
(0.47550)*** (0.46985)***
pop65 -3.77627 -3.69044
(0.87080)*** (0.86945)***
health-exp 2.53815 2.50644
(0.64179)*** (0.63735)***
economic -0.67217 -0.65246
(0.28855)** (0.28374)**
financial 0.26203 0.26759
(0.27955) (0.27293)
budget 0.88899 0.8705
(0.16104)*** (0.16224)***
health-aid -1.89134 -1.88454
(0.38418)*** (0.38282)***
physician-mig 0.36312 0.34029
(0.12024)*** (0.12350)***
death-rate 0.85703 1.0118 0.13017
(0.24622)*** (0.32064)*** (0.17402)
Constant -50.4464 -21.77136 -52.20164 -23.32601
(16.08727)*** (5.64135)*** (16.14340)*** (5.98828)***
Observations 1420 1420 1420 1420
Notes:(i.)Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii.)* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 5: 3SLS Estimation - Indirect Impact
(1) (2) (3)
physicians-mig-tot death-rate health-aid-tot
gdp 0.15228 -0.25169 -0.6908
(0.19716) (0.03097)*** (0.12243)***
pop -0.04403 0.28061
(0.05665) (0.07017)***
politic -0.91345 -0.13389 0.64258
(0.58604) (0.11041) (0.54417)
death-rate 0.78117
(0.42730)*
health-aid-tot -0.04164
(0.01579)***
tuberculosis 0.22049
(0.01946)***
financial -0.3168
(0.10836)***
budget-gbr 0.30224
(0.04213)***
budget-fra 0.21935
(0.05002)***
Constant -1.78727 4.87912 -1.03778
(4.12390) (0.45072)*** (2.30844)
Observations 357 357 357
Notes:(i.)Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii.)* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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